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VALUING EUROPEAN OPTIONS WHEN THE TERMINAL VALUE
OF THE UNDERLYING ASSET IS UNOBSERVABLE
ABSTRACT
This paper addresses a problem which arises when option pricing techniques are
applied to the valuation of claims to real assets, where the claim allows its owner to
make strategic decisions in the future. Previous research has shown that such claims
can be treated as options on the underlying asset. The problem is that, as opposed
to the standard assumption in previous academic research in this area, the value of
the underlying asset will typically not be perfectly observable at the time of the future
(exercise) decision making opportunity. By making specific assumptions on the
nature of the asset value unobservability and on the existence of a unique equilibrium
pricing measure, we derive a quasi-closed form solution to the value of such a claim.
Furthermore, we show that this solution is identical to the Black-Scholes formula with
either time to maturity or asset return variance reduced by a factor which decreases
in the variance of the noise at maturity. Two examples, treating the valuation of risky
corporate debt and of a research and development project, respectively, demonstrate
that the issue can be of significant economic importance. Also, the last example
demonstrates that, by letting the variance of the asset value noise at maturity be
endogenous, we can derive a simple model of the value of information systems to
corporate decision makers.

Option pricing models have been applied to solve a large number of problems
beyond the valuation of exchange traded puts and calls on common stock, which was
the main focus of the seminal papers by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton
(1973). Such research has focused on optimal strategic decision making and the
accompanying valuation of the right to decide. Examples of such papers 1 include
research on the valuation of natural resources (Brennan and Schwartz, 1985;
McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Gibson and Schwartz, 1990; Paddock, Siegel and Smith,
1988), of risky corporate debt (Merton, 1974; Geske 1977; Kan 1991), of undeveloped
land (Williams, 1989; Titman, 1985; Quigg, 1990), of research and development
limited partnerships (Shevlin, 1991), and of manufacturing flexibility (Myers, 1977;
Majd and Pindyck, 1987; Mason and Trigeorgis, 1987; Pindyck, 1988; Hodder and
Triantis, 1990). Common to most of these applications is that the exact value of the
underlying asset of the option may not be perfectly observable at the time an exercise
decision is made. This fact has generally been disregarded by finance researchers,
who have typically assumed a structure on the problem so that standard option
pricing models apply.
This paper demonstrates that, if instead of being able to observe the true
value of the underlying asset at maturity the decision maker (option holder) is only
allowed to observe a noisy signal, several aspects of the problem change. In
particular, the decision maker now has to solve a non-trivial problem in order to
1 This literature is vast and rapidly growing, so a full survey would be outside the scope of this paper. For
a good introduction to this area together with an overview of the early work see Mason and Merton (1985).
decide whether to exercise an expiring option. We show that, under these
circumstances the option holder will, with a positive probability, exercise out-of-the
money option, as well as not exercise in-the-money options. This not only uniformly
reduces the time value of the option, it changes a rationally exercised option from
being a zero liability asset into an asset offering potentially large losses. Furthermore,
we show that there will be a range of values of the underlying asset where the value
of a call option will decrease in the true value of the asset, counter to traditional
intuition. By making certain assumptions on the exact nature of the noise in the
observed value of the underlying asset and on the existence of a unique equilibrium
pricing measure, we derive a quasi-closed form solution for the pricing of European
call options in this setting. Furthermore, we show that this solution is identical to the
Black-Scholes formula for the call value with either return variance or time to
maturity reduced by a factor that decreases in the variance of the noise at maturity.
The pricing results are interesting from a general point of view, in that they
demonstrate that the source of the time value in a European option is a measure of
the average "revealed return volatility" until maturity, rather than total return
volatility.
The valuation model is applied to rework Merton's (1974) analysis of risky
corporate debt, and to investigate a modified version of Shevlin's (1991) valuation of
R&D limited partnerships. In both cases we demonstrate that even fairly moderate
levels of noise can have a non-trivial economic impact. The latter example also
makes it clear that by letting the precision of future information be a decision
variable, a fairly rich model of corporate decision making can arise out of a simple
structure. We conclude by pointing out possible venues for generalization and
applications of this framework.
I. THE BASIC MODEL
In order to focus our attention on the specific effects of the asset price being
unknown at the maturity of the option, we shall make a number of simplifying
assumptions. This will allow us to draw very sharp conclusions, and it also facilitates
comparison with previous theoretical models. Therefore, consider an economy with
a risk free asset earning interest at a constant rate r, a risky asset, and a call option
on this asset. It is assumed that the value of the risky asset follows a geometric
Brownian Motion with a variance of cr2 per time period. At time we can observe
its initial value2
,
S
,
but from time to time r, the maturity date of the option, the
true value of the risky asset is unobservable. Instead of observing the true asset value
at maturity, S
T ,
the option holder can observe Z=S
T
e
x
,
where x is independent of the
asset price and assumed to be distributed normally with a mean of (-y 2/2) and a
variance of y
2
. Here, ex represents noise, which by assumption is unbiased3
,
multiplicative, and lognormally distributed. Lognormality is assumed for reasons of
tractability, whereas we believe that the multiplicative nature of the noise corresponds
: The assumption that S is observable is discussed further in Section III.
3 The mean of x is assumed to be -y 2/2 (rather than 0) in order for the mean of ex to be 1.
3
fairly well to the way people estimate values.
To isolate the informational effects of this unobservability we also assume that
equilibrium pricing of all contingent claims dependent on ST can be performed in the
standard way by taking expectations under a unique equilibrium risk adjusted
probability measure, under which the asset price discounted by the risk free interest
rate follows a martingale. We will also assume that there is no risk premium
attached to the uncertainty induced by x. This is reasonable to the extent that x is
pure noise and small relative to aggregate economy, in which case it will be
approximately independent of aggregate consumption. However, as our pricing
assumptions cannot be justified directly by arbitrage arguments they should be
considered as arising from an equilibrium. Such an equilibrium was first derived by
Rubinstein (1976), and relies on a representative agent whose preferences can be
represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function featuring constant
relative risk aversion. For a recent example of applications of this framework to
contingent claims pricing, see the papers of Milne and Turnbull (1989,1991).
The option to be considered is a European call option on the asset with
maturity date r and exercise price K. The first decision to be made is with respect
to the rational exercise policy of the option. This is trivial if y=0, i.e. in the standard
case, but not so here. Under the assumptions outlined above, the holder of the
option will make the exercise decision on the basis of an estimate of the true value
of the underlying asset at maturity, formed from the initial value and the observed
noisy signal, Z. The optimal policy in this setting is to exercise the option if and only
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if the conditional expectation of the terminal asset price under the risk adjusted
probability measure is greater than the exercise price. We show that the conditional
expectation in question is given by a certain geometric variance-weighted average of
the time price and the noisy signal, corrected for loss of convexity.
Proposition 1
The optimal exercise policy at maturity of the option described above is to
exercise the option if and only if P>K, where:
.-*£) (1)
Here, F0t is the time forward price for the underlying asset, i.e.
F
0>t
= S e" (2)
and a is given by:
a - -^- (3)
2 2
Y +o
z
t
Proof
Under the risk adjusted probability measure, option holders act as if they were
risk neutral, independent of their true preferences. Thus, it suffices to show that the
policy given in the proposition maximizes the expected cash flow from the option.
Since not exercising ensures a cash flow of zero, it therefore follows immediately that
it is rational to exercise if and only if the expected cash flow from exercising (under
the risk adjusted probability measure, conditional on the noisy signal) is positive.
For P to be (a version of) the conditional expectation of S
T
given Z, it needs
to be measurable with respect to the cr-field generated by Z, cr(Z), and have the
property that (see e.g. Shiryayev 1984, p. 211):
E[xASx] = E[XaP] , VAeo(Z) (4)
Here, %a is me indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the event A
occurs and is zero otherwise. P is obviously cr(Z)-measurable, since it is an explicit
function of Z. To verify (4) we will use the fact that this function is globally
invertible and a.s. positive, and therefore, by a standard limit argument it follows that
the set of functions of the form X{P>K } for K>0 generates cr(Z). Thus, we need to
confirm that :
E[(,S,-P)X
IP>K) } • °
V**° (5)
If we rewrite S
T
as ey
,
use the definition of Z, and reorganize slightly we can express
the left hand side of (5) as:
\(s,-P)x [P>K} ] = E
y _
ay+ax+
ay
2 p(l-«)
•U > -iln(«/F
T ) +hi(FQ t ) -^ -jrl
(6)
We will compute this expectation by first conditioning on x and integrating over the
distribution of y, and subsequently integrate the result over x:
*t<V>X,P>r>]
= / /
ay
ov*az+
—
—
,, .
e e r0,t )
^4)'
2a2T
lhKJt7Faf)*ln(Fat)-^-x
yj2no 2x
dy
2 (7)
^ dxW
By completing the squares in x and y, splitting the expression into the sum of two
double integrals, and transforming one of the resulting outer integrals such that they
are both integrated w.r.t. the same normal density function, it can be shown that the
expression equals zero, independent of the value of K, if and only if a is given by (3).
Q.E.D.
Thus, the lower the variance of the noise, the more weight the option holder
puts on the noisy observation at maturity relative to the (noiseless) initial price
observation. As the variance of the noise goes from zero to infinity, the weight put
on the initial price goes from to 1. More precisely, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2
As y approaches infinity the terminal payoff to the option is linear in the value
of the asset.
Proof
Since we know that ST>0 a.s., we only need consider positive values of ST . It
then follows from (6) that the limit of the exercise probability will go to zero or one
according to whether F0t<K or F0t>K. In the special case of F0t=K, an arbitrary
convex combination of the two will be optimal, so we can set the exercise probability
equal to zero in this case without loss of generality. In either case, the terminal
payoff to the option is linear in ST .
Q.E.D.
Another way to phrase Proposition 2 is that as the signal to noise ratio at
maturity goes to zero the option can be treated as a forward contract for valuation
purposes. As we will see later, the generalized version of this result for a finite noise
variance is that the option can be treated as an option on a forward contract in the
corresponding noiseless economy, where the time to maturity of the option is
declining in the variance of the noise.
In the above proof, it is important to take the limit in the right order when
considering what happens as the variance goes to infinity at the same time as the
asset value goes to zero. If we fix y and let the asset value go to zero, we obtain a
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terminal payoff of 0, regardless of F0t and y. Then, clearly the limit as y goes to
infinity must also be 0. But, we have just argued that in the case of F0t>K we will
exercise with probability 1 in the limit as y goes to infinity, for any S T >0. Thus, this
must also hold in the limit, as S
T
goes to 0, in which case the terminal payoff is -K.
Therefore, we see that the conclusion depends on the order in which we take the
limit. Since we know that the true asset value is strictly greater than zero with
probability one, it would appear that the economically relevant limit is to fix any
stock price greater than zero, and notice that the limit policy is to always exercise if
the option is initially in the money.
Since the option is rationally exercised when P>K, the net value accruing to
the option holder at maturity is given by:
K - 0,-*)xIM} <8>
This gives rise to our next result, namely that the option no longer has a non-negative
payoff in all states of the world.
Proposition 3
The value at maturity of an ex ante rationally exercised call option will be
negative with a strictly positive probability, given any combination of F0t and Z
resulting in exercise, as long as y>0.
Proof
Note that the value at maturity of the option is negative if ST<K. All we need
to show is therefore that P>K does not imply ST>K with probability 1. Using (1) and
the definition of Z it follows that we can write:
.21 <^> _r (9)
5
T
= e-
xP aF0x
a
e
2 K }
That is, given the forecast, P, S
T
has a non-degenerate lognormal distribution. Thus,
for any K>0, the probability of S
T
<K is strictly positive, since the lognormal
4
distribution has all of R+ as its support. Finally, note that the result is independent
of the individual components of P.
Q.E.D.
For each value of ST, we can compute the terminal value of the option at
maturity given the outcome of the noise variable x. If we plot this terminal value
function for a given x, as illustrated in Figure 1, we see that if x<0, the function is
discontinuous but non-negative and (weakly) monotonic. For x>0, however, the
function is neither non-negative nor monotonic. Only if x happens to be exactly equal
to zero do we recover the standard continuous, non-negative, and weakly monotonic
and convex payoff generally associated with call options.
We can take the expected value of the terminal value of the option for each
value of ST by integrating over the distribution of x. Under our parametric
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assumptions, the probability of rational exercise for a given value of ST can be shown
to be given by:
Pr[P>K\S^} = *
G 2T
-In
0,T
I K ) 1 \k,
(10)
Since not exercising the option results in a zero value, the expected value of the
option at maturity as a function of ST is therefore given by:
V
X
(S
X)
= (S
x
-K)$
2
T
In
F \
J.
Y K)
(ID
This function is illustrated in Figure 2, and it has several interesting properties
when compared to the standard noiseless call option payoff. First of all, if the final
asset value happens to equal the exercise price, the exercise decision is irrelevant and
thus the presence of the noise does not entail any loss in value. As the stock price
approaches zero, the probability of exercising approaches zero, and since the loss
from exercising is finite, the expected loss due to the noise also approaches zero.
Similarly, as the stock price goes to infinity the probability of exercising approaches
one and the expected value of the loss approaches zero since the loss from not
exercising grows linearly in the stock price whereas the probability of such a loss
declines exponentially. We also notice that the further the option is in-the-money
(out-of-the-money) at time 0, the more likely will the holder be to exercise an out-of-
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the-money option (not exercise an in-the-money option) at maturity for a given value
of S_. Since, for values of the terminal asset price less than K there is a strictly
positive probability of values of x resulting in exercise, these asset values are
associated with a negative expected terminal value of the option. This is a stronger
result than Proposition 3, so we will record it as Proposition 4.
Proposition 4
For any value of the terminal asset price less than the exercise price, the
expected terminal value of the option is strictly negative.
Proof
From the form of (11) it is trivially seen that ST<K results in a non-positive
value of VT . In addition, as long as v>0 it follows that the conditional probability of
exercise is strictly positive for any values of ST and K.
Q.E.D.
It also follows immediately from the discussion above that since the expected
terminal value of the option goes to zero when the underlying asset value approaches
zero and that the value is strictly negative for asset values between and K that there
must be a range of asset values wherein the expected option value declines in the
value of the underlying asset. This result is somewhat non-intuitive and contrasts
sharply with corresponding results for options under full observability of prices. The
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intuition behind this result is that, even if the loss on an "accidentally" exercised out
of the money option declines dollar for dollar as the true asset price increases, the
probability of such an exercise occurring will grow faster than linearly for sufficiently
low asset prices. Thus we have:
Proposition 5
For 0<S
T
<S*<K, we have that the value at maturity of a rationally exercised
call option is strictly declining in ST , where S* is the unique solution to the following
equation in S:
$ -l-]n(F JK)+±ki(S/K)
o
2
t Y
1-*
S
4> ln(FOT/tf) +J-ln(S//0
G 2T
= (12)
Proof
By differentiating (11) with respect to ST and setting the resulting expression
equal to zero we have (12), which is the first order condition for a critical point of
V
T . It suffices to show that such a critical point exists, is unique, and lies in (0,K) to
prove the proposition, since in this case V
T
will be below zero, and obviously not a
maximum. This will be shown by rewriting (12) as:
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G(S) =
S = G(S)
where
K
{ +
*[h(S)] ( 13>
ft(5) = -l-ln(F0t/X) + lln(5/J0
crx Y
The existence of a unique interior minimum of VT() is thus equivalent to the
existence of a unique fixed point for the function G(). We will note that as S ranges
from 0* to oo, h(S) is continuous and strictly increasing from -» to «, and also use
the following properties of the normal distribution:
i) 3>(x)/(£(x) is strictly increasing in x,
ii) lim^ [3>(x)/0(x)] = oo,
and that
iii) linw [<*>(x)/0(x)] = 0.
Then, it is easily seen that as S goes from + to oo, G(S) is continuous and strictly
declining from K to 0. Thus, by the mean value theorem, 3!S* satisfying 0<S*<K
and G(S*)=S*, and the proof is complete.
Q.E.D.
Before we compute the exact initial valuation formula for the option we record
some general results on the relationship between the initial option values and the
variance of the noise.
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Proposition 6
The initial value of an option is always strictly positive as long as y is finite.
The value of the option is always strictly lower than the corresponding Black-Scholes
value as long as y is positive. The intrinsic value of the option is independent of y,
so any effect on the option value of the noise at maturity enters through the time
value.
Proof
The value of the option is non-negative since the holder can always implement
an exercise policy of never exercising, thus leaving it with a certain zero payoff and
value. Also, if the option is initially in the money (comparing the exercise to the
asset's forward price), then a policy of always exercising results in a terminal value
equal to that of a forward contract which then has a positive initial value by
assumption. Out of the money options have initial value if any information about the
terminal value of the asset can be extracted from the noisy price report, such that a
sufficiently high Z implies that the expected value of S
T
is higher than K. This will
be the case as long as the noise has finite variance. It can be seen from (6) that, as
long as y>0, the probability of making (ex post) wrong exercise decisions is strictly
positive, and thus the initial value must reflect these losses relative to the noiseless
situation. The intrinsic value of the option, e"rTmax[FOT-K,0], does not in any way
involve the noise term, x.
Q.E.D.
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Proposition 7
The initial value of a European call option with time to maturity r, exercise
price K, initial asset price S
,
asset return standard deviation a per time period, with
a risk free interest rate given by r, and with the variance of the noise in the observed
terminal asset value is given by y
2
,
is:
Vn = e
= S *
f(e y -tf)Q
OB
ln(F0T/*) +
(r \
a
2
x
G 2T
-In
0,T
( K )
+
-(y-ln(*))
Y
y-ln(F
(**#
2ozx
sjllZQ'
<fy
Oyfz
-Ke n$
HF jv- o
2
x
2
ayx
lB(Jf)
- 6
- e
J {K-e
y)Q
j (e y-£)Q
ln(X)
G2T
-In
0,t
a
2
x
-In
I *J
F
+ J-(v-ln(/Q)
Y
H^^f
2o2t
^271 o
:
dy
1
(ln(AO-v)
H^ffi
2o2t
v/2tio :
^
(14)
Proof
Writing ST=e
y it follows that, under the risk adjusted probability measure, y
is normally distributed with a mean of ln(F T)-cr
2
r/2 and a variance of cr2r. This,
together with (11) and our pricing assumption immediately imply the first equation
in (14). The second equation follows from straightforward manipulation of the
integral.
Q.E.D.
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We recognize the first line in the option valuation formula as the Black-
Scholes value of the option, i.e. the value the option would have had if there were
no noise (y=0). The second and third line represent, respectively, the loss in value
due to exercising the option when it is out of the money, and the loss arising from not
exercising the option when it is in the money. It is easily seen that the integrands in
each of these terms are strictly positive, as long as gamma is positive and finite.
The valuation formula given in (14) is somewhat cumbersome from both a
numerical and analytical point of view, even though the intuition behind its derivation
is very straightforward. Clearly, a very similar form can be derived by first
conditioning on the asset price and integrating over x, and subsequently integrating
over the asset price distribution. Unfortunately, the resulting valuation formula is
equally complex and we do not believe it warrants further study. Instead, we will in
the following derive two alternative characterizations of the initial value of the option,
both of which are in the form as the Black-Scholes formula and therefore a much
more convenient starting point for computations and comparative statics. Further-
more, we think that the derivations of these alternative formulas may have some
independent interest in terms of shedding additional light on the source of the time
value of options.
Proposition 8
The initial value of the option given in (14) can also be represented as the
Black-Scholes value of an option on the same asset with r replaced by ar and K
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replaced by Ke"(1
"a)Tr
,
where a is given by (3). That is, the value is:
Vo = *o*
HFo.J(Ke-a-«>w)U
o
2
<xt
2
/aT
- Ke^-^'e-'^Q
HFo,J(Ke -il- a)rry
o
2at
2
.
a^ar
(15)
Proof
Consider first the value of an option to enter into a long position in a forward
contract on the same underlying asset in a standard noiseless Black-Scholes economy.
The option matures at ar, for some a in (0,1), its exercise price is given by K, and
the forward contract matures at time r. Using standard results for the pricing of
options on forward contracts, we find the value of this contract to be given by (15).
Now, assume that if the option is exercised, the forward contract is held to maturity,
at which time it will yield a net cash flow of S
T
-K. Therefore, the total cash flow at
K is given by:
*i = MxcF.„>*> (16)
Compare (16) to (8), bearing in mind our assumption of pricing by taking
expectations under a unique martingale measure and discounting at a constant risk
free rate of interest. It then follows that the value of this forward option equals the
value of the option that we want to price if the joint distribution of ST and FaTT under
the equivalent martingale measure coincides with the joint distribution of ST and P
18
in the noisy world. It is straightforward to show that this is the case if and only if a
is given by (3).
Q.E.D.
Proposition 9
The initial value of the option given in (14) can also be represented as the
Black-Scholes value of an option on the same asset with a2 replaced by acr2
,
where
a is given by (3). Thus, the value can be expressed as:
Vn = So*
In
(F )
0,T
I
K J
(cco2)t
+— -
—
2
- Ke'"®
In
(F ) (aa2)t
2
(>/S o)ft (/ao)/t
(17)
We believe that it is instructive to give two independent proofs of this
proposition. The first proof relies on an economically motivated argument, deriving
the result from first principles. The second proof takes advantage of the previous
proposition and a homogeneity property of the Black-Scholes model. That is, aside
from a discounting effect, the value of the Black-Scholes formula remains constant
under simultaneous changes of the time to maturity and the asset return variance that
leave their product unchanged.
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Proof #1
Rewrite the payoff function given in (8) as:
V, = (P-K)X iP>K) * <.S,-P)X{F>K]
= maxS^e axF^' a)e 2 ~K ,
(18)
(s,-p)x lP>K]
The first expression can be valued by the standard technique once we realize
that under the equivalent martingale measure, the stochastic term has a log-normal
distribution with mean equal to the initial forward price, and the variance of its
logarithm is given by:
Vai{]n(S*e ax)
ii ii
o
2
x
\2
2 2
o
zt+y
(o 2T+y2)
(19)
= aax
Therefore, the time value of the first term is given by the Black-Scholes
formula with cr2 replaced by acr2
,
and in order to complete the proof of the theorem
we need to show that the present value of the second term is for all values of K.
But, as we demonstrated in the proof of Proposition 1, this term has an expected
value of under the risk adjusted probability measure for any K>0, and its present
value is therefore 0.
Q.E.D.
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Proof #2
This proposition follows directly from the previous one by direct comparison
of (15) and (17), using the following simple relationships:
(ao2)t
\fao\fx
= o
2((xt)
nK
t v \
In
0,T
{ K )
ov/aT
e
-rat(A:e -Kl-«)T)
/ C ~rz\ /
= In
V
K
= In
O.at
[ Ke
-Kl-a)xj
(20)
Q.E.D.
In order to directly confirm our previous claim that only the time value of the
option is affected by the unobservable nature of the asset's final value, we can rewrite
the two Black-Scholes formula representations above in terms of the intrinsic value/
time value decomposition of Carr and Jarrow (1990):
V = maxtSo -#<?-",()] + e -re (sfao)K } 1m
In
0,T
K
(ao2)t
K
(yfaa)yft j
dt
= max[5
n -^e"
rT
,0] + e
-moKe-*-** r 1
it
(
In
F1
0,<XT
KB-*-**
o
2
t
+
2
k
<3\[t
dt
(21)
The conclusion is that the option pricing formula in the case of the noisy signal
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at maturity can be treated as the noiseless Black-Scholes formula with the assets
return volatility replaced with a measure of its average "revealed volatility". That is,
the higher is the noise in the final observation, the less of the asset price volatility is
actually revealed, and it is from the revelation of asset price volatility that the option
derives its time value, not from the volatility itself.
II. TWO APPLICATIONS
In order to demonstrate the basic model developed above, we will give two
examples of applications of the framework. The first relates to Merton's model of
the risk structure of corporate debt, and the second to an option based valuation
approach to research and development projects.
II. 1 Pricing Risky Corporate Debt
Consider an upstart company that is raising S in debt and equity. The debt
is in the form of a zero coupon bond with face value of K that matures in r years
from now. The bond covenants preclude the company from making any dividend
payouts before r, and it is also assumed that the capital budgeting decisions of the
firm are fixed in such a way that the value of the firm's assets from time to time
r follows a geometric Brownian Motion with a standard deviation of a per year.
Finally, we assume that the value of the firm's assets at maturity is unobservable, but
22
that an appraisal will be made, resulting in an estimated value of the firm equal to
STe
x
,
where x is distributed as N(-y 2/2,v 2). We would argue that this is a more
realistic scenario than one where the company management/owners can exactly
observe the true value of the assets at the maturity time, as assumed in previous
applications of the option pricing methodology to this setting. We will maintain the
assumptions necessary to price the corporate liabilities through the equilibrium
martingale measure, and ask the question: What is the equilibrium promised yield to
maturity on the company's risky debt?
As is well known, the initial value of the equity, V
,
should be exactly equal
to the value of a maturity r European call option on the assets of the company with
exercise price K, and the initial value of the debt is therefore S -V . We have already
valued such an option in Propositions 7-9, and there we concluded that the value of
the option is equal to its Black-Scholes value minus two positive terms caused by the
unobservability of the asset value at maturity. Thus, ignoring this unobservability
would tend to overstate the initial value of the equity and correspondingly understate
the value of the debt. This would result in a promised yield to maturity of the debt
that is too high. Notice that this result is not due to any informational asymmetries;
the debtholders' knowledge at maturity is completely irrelevant, since they are not
making any decisions at this time.
In order to gauge the economic importance of the unobservable asset values
at maturity, we use (17) to compute the equilibrium promised return on the bonds
for different values of y and K, in a setting where the other parameters were held
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constant as S =1000, cj=.3, r=10%, and r=l. The equilibrium promised return is
computed as ln(K/(S -V )), where V is given by (11). Table 1 reports the results for
some plausible (?) combinations of the face value of the debt and noise at maturity.
Table 1 - EQUILIBRIUM PROMISED YIELD (in % p.a.)
K=700 K=800 K=900
Y
2
=0.00 11.05 12.54 14.97
Y
2
=0.01 10.82 12.15 14.41
y
2
=0.02 10.65 11.82 13.95
Y
2
=0.03 10.52 11.57 13.56
The first row in the table gives the equilibrium promised yields to maturity on
the risky bonds in the case of a fully observable asset value at maturity, i.e. the
standard solution. The following three rows contain the corresponding yields for
increasing, but seemingly low, levels of variance for the log of the noise at maturity.
We find it interesting that such low levels of noise can have so dramatic impacts on
the bond yields, and we take this as an indication that our model represents a
significant economic issue, as opposed to a theoretical curiosity.
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112 Valuing a R&D Limited Partnership
Our second example will address the question of the ex ante value of an
information system in connection with an investment in a risky project. Consider a
company that is evaluating a capital budgeting proposal to invest in a research and
development limited partnership4 with a fixed time horizon of two years. At the end
of this time period, the company must decide whether to drop the project or buy out
the other partners at a cost of K dollars. In the former case, only the initial
investment is lost, whereas in the latter case, the firm achieves full rights to
commercial use of the research generated by the partnership. If we denote the value
of these rights after 2 years as S2 and assume that this value is lognormally distributed
and unobservable, it is clear how we can apply our framework to determine a fair
value of a partnership investment. We believe that it is quite reasonable that the
uncertainty about the value of the research after 2 years in unobservable, and that
the measurement error resulting from an appraisal can be substantial. Also, it is
more likely than not that the "option" is initially out of the money, i.e. that if the
company had to make a commitment decision at time zero they would have rejected
it. Otherwise, it would seem that keeping the project in house would be a more likely
arrangement than farming it out to a partnership.
Our additional twist on this problem is that if the company makes the
For a recent example of applications of traditional option pricing methods to value such
partnership, see Shevlin (1991). He actually assumes that K is random as well and uses Margrabe's
(1978) exchange option pricing model for his valuation purposes, but this is not an important
distinction.
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investment, they can also invest J (time 0) dollars in managerial capacity5 , and that
the more they invest the more precise information they will receive about S2 . To be
specific, we will assume that the variance of the noise in the appraisal at maturity is
given by:
2 2 -rj
Y = Yo* (22)
Here, Yo *s me standard deviation of the noise when no new capacity is added,
whereas the more (in terms of quantity and/or quality) managerial capacity is added,
the lower will y be. The parameter c is a measure of the cost efficiency of the
available information system technology. The company's decision problem can now
be solved by first valuing the option for a given J (and hence y
2
), and then
maximizing the resulting value over J. From our previous analysis it follows directly
that the initial value of the project as a function of J is given by:
where
In
(F )
{ K J
a(J)o2x
H —
2
MJ)oft
- Ke"$
If )
In
*«*
\ K )
a(J)o2x
2
MJ)os[x -J
«(/) =
G2T
2 2 -cJ
(23)
1 We use the term "managerial capacity" as an all-inclusive term for investments in people and/or
information systems that are irreversible in the short run and that will enhance the company's ability
to observe and evaluate the project.
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This function can be shown to have a unique maximum (not necessarily interior),
which can, in principle, be found by standard calculus tools. However, since we need
to solve a non-linear equation to find the optimal J, we will just present numerical
results here. To be specific, assume that cr=.4, S =1000, K=1500, r=10%, and
Y
2
=.2. The results are given in Table 2 for a wide range of values of c.
Table 2 - OPTIMAL DECISIONS AND VALUES
c J Y
2 V(J)
<.0303 .200 101.75
.0303 0.15 .199 101.75
.0305 0.71 .196 101.75
.031 1.99 .188 101.77
.032 4.24 .175 101.87
.033 6.15 .163 102.03
.034 7.80 .153 102.24
.035 9.23 .145 102.49
.036 10.48 .137 102.77
.037 11.56 .130 103.07
.038 12.52 .124 103.39
.039 13.37 .119 103.73
.04 14.12 .114 104.08
.05 18.25 .080 107.76
.06 19.43 .062 111.22
.07 19.52 .051 114.23
.08 19.16 .043 116.81
.09 18.61 .037 119.04
.1 18.00 .033 120.97
.2 12.86 .015 131.70
.3 10.01 .010 136.33
.4 8.25 .007 138.95
.5 7.06 .006 140.65
1 4.24 .003 144.50
2 2.47 .001 146.77
5 1.17 .001 148.37
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It turns out that if the managerial cost efficiency is sufficiently low (c<.0303),
the optimal solution is not to add any managerial capacity, and the value of the pro-
ject is equal to the base case value of 101.75 ($ mill.). However, for slightly higher
values of c the company will invest a considerable amount of money on an informa-
tion system. At first this will not generate significantly higher net values of the pro-
ject, but as the cost efficiency improves, the resulting increase in project value from
an optimal information system investment gets to be substantial. If there are techno-
logical solutions available that allow for a virtual elimination of the noise at maturity
at a trivial cost, the net value of the project is nearly 50% higher than in the base
case. Note that the optimal amount of money spent on information system capacity
is first increasing and subsequently decreasing in c. These results are illustrated in
Figure 3. 6
III. CONCLUSIONS AND SOME GENERALIZATIONS OF THE MODEL
We have considered the valuation of European call options7 in a setting which
differs from previous analyses primarily by admitting the possibility that the holder
of the option is restricted from gaining perfect information about the value of the
underlying asset at maturity. By choosing a convenient parametric form for the noise
in the signal of this underlying value, we were able to derive exact quasi-closed form
One might find it interesting to compare this result with the pattern of investment in computer
hardware, as its cost efficiency has dramatically increased over the last 30 years.
i
The valuation of European puts follows directly from put-call parity in this model.
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solutions to the optimal exercise and valuation problems. These solutions allowed us
both to analyze the problem further in theory and to work out a couple of illustrating
examples, hopefully demonstrating that the situation we have modeled is interesting
and economically relevant.
Having said this, it is clear that if we want to apply this type of model to real
world problems it would be useful to make some theoretical generalizations. First
of all, we should consider relaxing the "asymmetric" assumption of the intial value of
the underlying asset being observable while the future value is unobservable. As long
as we model the initial noise as being of the same form as that at maturity, this does
not seriously complicate the computations. However, it does bring up questions of
information asymmetries. Unless the initial, noisy signal of the asset value is publicly
observable, we have to address issues of private information aggregation and the
potential for a winner's curse problem.
In addition, we would also like to be able to address the valuation of exchange
options (Fischer, 1978; Margrabe 1978) with noisy signals of both the underlying asset
value and the exercise price, as well as for compound options (Geske 1977, 1979) and
American type claims that can be exercised before maturity. The latter two problems
open up the question of how to model multiple signals about the underlying asset
value. These could come continuously if we can observe trading of a marketed asset
whose price is imperfectly correlated with the underlying asset value, or they could
come at random times and with random variance, e.g. at times when other assets of
varying degrees of similarity are being sold. Finally, we should allow for the
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possibility of the holder of the option seeking further information, depending on the
signals received8 .
We believe that most of these issues can be fruitfully addressed, although
some of them may result in serious problems of tractability. The same holds for
attempts to generalize the distributional assumptions of the noise term. Of particular
interest in this regard will be signals of the form S
T >L, for some limit value L. These
type of signals can arise in connection with markets that are subject to trading halts
when prices moves too far too fast, and where some market participants possess
options of one form or another. A direct example of this problem would be found
in the valuation of futures options when there is a possibility of the futures contract
having limited out on the maturity day of the option. This is also closely related to
the work by Brennan (1986) on the relationship between futures price limits and the
decisions of traders to default on margin calls.
These questions, along with a host of applications are the subject of ongoing
research. Hopefully, we will soon be able to report more progress.
Comparing to the R&D example, seeking such additional information only if ex post desired
would correspond to relying on external "consultants" instead of building up an internal managerial
capacity.
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OPTION VALUE AT MATURITY
FOR DIFFERENT VALUES OF X
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